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ABSTRACT This article argues that the dominant paradigm in studies of British
small wars positing a central role of minimum force in doctrinal guidelines for
counterinsurgency needs to be even more fundamentally revised than has been
argued in recent debates. More specifically, it argues that minimum force is
nowhere to be found in British doctrine during the small wars of decolonisation.
The need for revision also applies to the way British counterinsurgency is usually
sharply contrasted with French counterinsurgency. British doctrine during this
period is better understood when placed in its proper historical context. This
means comparing it with the other two most significant examples of doctrinal
development for small wars of decolonisation – those of France and Portugal.
This comparison shows that British counterinsurgency was not uniquely
population-centric, and this characteristic cannot, therefore, be the reason for
its arguably superior if far from infallible performance. Evidence for these
arguments comes primarily from doctrinal sources developed specifically to deal
with counterinsurgency, complemented with insights from key military thinkers
and archival sources of relevance practices. Some wider implications of this
analysis for the relationship between combat experience and doctrinal develop-
ment as well as for counterinsurgency are identified.
KEY WORDS: Counterinsurgency, Colonial wars, Doctrine
Challenging the Dominance of Minimum Force in Studies of British
COIN
Studies of British counterinsurgency have traditionally focused a great
deal of attention on the small wars of decolonisation – particularly the
success stories of Malaya (1948–60) and Kenya (1952–60) – positing a
central role for minimum force in the doctrinal guidelines developed to
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deal victoriously with these insurgencies. The present article will argue
that a central aspect of this traditional vision is fundamentally wrong:
the alleged centrality of minimum force in British counterinsurgency
during this period.
The core argument of this article is that alongside the failure to
practise minimum force in the British small wars of decolonisation, a
point that has attracted increasing attention in revisionist analysis,
there is an amazingly unnoticed but, in fact, total absence of the
principle of minimum force from official British military guidelines
developed specifically for counterinsurgency overseas after 1945 and
until as late as the early 1970s. Noting this absence is not necessarily a
critique of British doctrine; it is, however, a major criticism of the way
British counterinsurgency doctrine has so often been portrayed in
existing studies, raising a number of important issues.
Yet, despite this doctrinal absence, can British counterinsurgency
overseas during this period still be characterised as uniquely
population-centric, and therefore fundamentally different from more
coercive enemy-centric approaches to counterinsurgency? To answer
this vital question, British counterinsurgency during decolonisation
must be placed in its historical context. This will be done by
examining it in comparison to the other two cases of similarly
protracted decolonisation campaigns that led to significant doctrinal
development for counterinsurgency: the often mentioned case of
France, and the often neglected case of Portugal. A comparison
between counterinsurgency as practised by Western colonial powers
in a period of decolonisation seems to make more sense than to look
at very different regimes such as Nazi Germany or the USSR, which
were willing to resort to extreme force as a matter of course; or the
American superpower in Vietnam, with its massive availability of
firepower.
But our focus on the period of decolonisation has other reasons.
After 1945, insurgents were often armed with modern weapons and
nationalist slogans and benefited from cross-border sanctuaries, in
contrast with the isolated, poorly armed, mostly tribal uprisings against
colonialism that took place before the Second World War. These
decades, therefore, saw the beginning of a trend of increasingly
frequent and relevant intrastate wars.1 They also came to be seen as the
classical era of counterinsurgency and rich in useful – particularly
1Michael Brown (ed.), Grave New World: Security Challenges in the Twenty-First
Century (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2003, 2–3, points out that only 18 per cent
of conflicts between 1945 and 1995 have been conventional wars. For similar data for
more recent years see SIPRI Yearbooks 5www.sipri.org/contents/publications/
yearbooks.html4.
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British – lessons on how to win unconventional wars.2 Any significant
revision of the dominant analysis of British counterinsurgency during
this period therefore has important implications not only for the
historical record regarding doctrine in specific decolonisation cam-
paigns but also for our understanding of counterinsurgency. More
specifically, this article should make us question whether present
attempts to emulate past British successes in counterinsurgency have a
solid historical basis.
A text of this length cannot be expected to offer exhaustive evidence
of guidelines and practices in all British, French and Portuguese
counterinsurgency campaigns. Still, a comparative analysis focused on
supporting the claim that the existing literature on British counter-
insurgency has tended to overemphasise its uniqueness in terms of
minimum force is indispensable to support our core argument.
The key issues addressed in the main sections of this article are: What
were the British doctrinal guidelines for fighting insurgencies and what
role did minimum force play in them? Was British doctrine significantly
different from French and Portuguese doctrine during their largely
contemporary decolonisation campaigns? Before trying to offer
answers to these questions, however, two subsections will provide a
brief review of the relevant literature and definitions of key concepts.
Studies of British Counterinsurgency and Minimum Force
Where concise definitions of British counterinsurgency in existing
studies are concerned, minimum force, or some close equivalent of it, is
one of the most dominant labels, if not the most dominant label. A
significant number of authors who have analysed British counter-
insurgency refer to minimum force as a key doctrinal principle in the
main British campaigns fought overseas after 1945.3
Thomas Mockaitis, whose work has rightly been seen as a landmark
in the study of British counterinsurgency, has been a particularly strong
advocate of the centrality of minimum force in all major British
2For the salience of this era of classical COIN in today’s strategic debates see, e.g.,
Frank Hoffman, ‘Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency’, Parameters 37/2 (2007), 71–87.
3E.g., and just to cite some of the most influential works that adhere to this notion:
Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army’s Way in Warfare 1945–95
(London: Brassey’s 1996) 116–17; David Charters, ‘The British Adaptation to Low
Intensity Operation from Palestine to Northern Ireland’, in David Charters (ed.),
Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict (London: Brassey’s 1989), 228; Charles Townshend,
Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and
Faber 1986), 19; John Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam:
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport: Praeger 2002), 205.
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campaigns after 1919, stating that: ‘it would be difficult to exaggerate
the importance of the principle of minimum force to British counter-
insurgency’.4 He also draws a sharp contrast between British and
French counterinsurgency, with the Algerian campaign presented as a
paradigmatic example of the ‘bankruptcy of French methods’ because
of an unexplained propensity for brutal coercion and blind retaliation.5
In one of the few books conceived as a synthesis and guide to the
literature on counterinsurgencies, Anthony Joes echoes this very strong
trend in analyses of British counterinsurgency portraying it as using
force ‘to the minimum level possible’ in its campaigns, and presenting
British small wars of decolonisation as exemplary cases of success ‘in
contrast to the French tendency to resort to general punishment and
intimidation’.6
It is true that there are increasing signs of a crisis in this minimum
force paradigm, but so far it has resulted in partial and, in my view,
insufficient revisions. A recent generic analysis of violence in the
twentieth century, reflecting this significantly stated that while counter-
insurgency had often been one of the reasons the century was so
violent, yet the British ‘defined a doctrine of ‘‘minimum force’’,
although they did not always live up to it’.7
Monographic studies have, indeed, documented in great detail,
particularly in the case of Kenya, the extent to which British
counterinsurgency could be very violent in practice.8 Articles published
in a dossier on British counterinsurgency in Defense and Security
Analysis were pertinently characterised as being part of an emerging
trend towards a ‘revision’ of the prevailing vision of a ‘softly, softly
4Thomas Mockaitis, ‘The Origins of British Counter-Insurgency’, Small Wars and
Insurgencies, 1/3 (1990), 213.
5Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919–1960 (London: Macmillan
1990), 56 passim; Thomas Mockaitis, ‘A New Era of COIN’, RUSI Journal, 136/1
(1991), 75.
6Anthony Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency
(Lexington: U of Kentucky P 2006), 221–2. Pointedly, the author exempts the mature
stage of the Algerian campaign from this failure.
7Mark Mazower, ‘Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century’, The American
Historical Review, 107/4 (2002), 1175.
8On Kenya see David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya
and the End of Empire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2005); Caroline Elkins,
Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry
Holt 2005). As example of the debate these books generated see Neal Ascherson, ‘The
Breaking of the Mau Mau’, New York Review of Books, 52/6 (2005), 5www.ny-
books.com/articles/178964; David Elstein, ‘The End of The Mau Mau’, New York
Review of Books, 52/11 (2005), 5www.nybooks.com/articles/180964.
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approach’ in British counterinsurgency;9 and the same could be said of
another even more recent dossier on the subject in the Journal of
Strategic Studies.10
But the break with a paradigm of British counterinsurgency
triumphant after 1945 because of minimum force is still far from
prevalent or clear enough. Rod Thornton, in particular, has given the
paradigm of minimum force renewed force by defending not only the
importance of it in British counterinsurgency but also that it has deeper
historical roots than even Mockaitis and others had argued, being
important in counterinsurgency campaigns earlier than 1919, therefore
making the principle of minimum force in British counterinsurgency
even older, more specific and more salient.11 In a recent debate he
reiterated this point of view in response to criticism of the minimum
force paradigm.12
While there are some texts that point to some problems with the
dominant view of British counterinsurgency; their focus, however, is on
specific campaigns and on the differences between doctrinal principles
and coercive practices. A good example of this is Huw Bennett’s debate
with Rod Thornton regarding the lightness of the empirical evidence of
the practice of minimum force as opposed to strong evidence of
retaliatory practices.13 But in the end Bennett focused too much on
the differences between doctrinal principles and coercive practices and
goes too far – for reasons presented in the next subsection – in generically
questioning the significance of doctrine in counterinsurgency or even in
military campaigns in general but not far enough in not fundamentally
questioning the traditional assumption of the existence of a generic
British doctrinal principle of minimum force for counterinsurgency
throughout the entire period of the decolonisation campaigns.
This norm-versus-practice approach to the problem of minimum
force is, in fact, not entirely new. Examples of it can be found even in
the work of authors who use it to continue to advocate the importance
of minimum force. For instance, the British campaign in Kenya (1952–
9Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: An American
View’, Defense and Security Analysis, 23/2 (2007), 230–31. This introduction
syntheses this thematic issue of the journal.
10Paul Dixon, ‘‘‘Hearts and Minds?’’ British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’,
Journal of Strategic Studies, 32/3 (2009), 353–81.
11Rod Thornton, ‘The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy’,
Small Wars and Insurgencies, 15/1 (2004), 83–106.
12Rod Thornton, ‘‘‘Minimum Force’’: A Reply to Huw Bennett’, Small Wars and
Insurgencies, 20/1 (2009), 215–26.
13Huw Bennett, ‘British Minimum Force’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21/3 (2010),
459–75.
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60) resulted in a debate between Newsinger and Mockaitis, with the
latter accepting that Kenya was an example of abuses, but insisting they
were atypical practices committed mostly by local militias and that
there was therefore no need for a fundamental revision of the centrality
of minimum force as a norm in British army counterinsurgency
doctrine.14 Newsinger insisted that Kenya was an ‘important exception’
to the norm in practice, but still accepted that as a rule there was
a ‘relative restraint of British counterinsurgency’ when compared
with its French, Dutch or Portuguese counterparts.15
These limited revisions are insufficient. What is required is a clear
recognition of the absence of minimum force as a rule and in principle –
i.e., in official doctrine – as well as in practice, in British counter-
insurgency during the entire period of the small wars of decolonisation.
In fact, as this article will show, theatre-specific doctrine especially
developed for ongoing campaigns provides important evidence, ignored
in debates so far, of the absence of a minimum force guideline for
counterinsurgency during Britain’s decolonisation campaigns.
Defining Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Minimum Force
Counterinsurgency is understood here to be a form of asymmetrical
armed conflict where one side, the insurgents or guerrillas, is
fundamentally weaker than the counterinsurgents or conventional
armed forces and therefore has to organise differently both for the
purposes of combat and to violently challenge the political status quo.
If insurgency is ‘the armed expression’ of ‘internal political disaffilia-
tion’; counterinsurgency, to achieve even minimal success, must be a
form of armed state (re)building.16
Military doctrine is defined in this article as officially sanctioned
guidelines, since authoritative norms are consensually seen as
doctrine, whether or not other elements are then added to this core.
References to semiformal or informal doctrine seem potentially
14John Newsinger, ‘Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau
Rebellion’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 3/1 (1992), 47–57; Thomas Mockaitis,
‘Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau Rebellion: A Reply’,
Small Wars and Insurgencies, 3/2 (1992), 87–9.
15John Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland
(Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002), 1–2.
16Larry Cable, ‘Reinventing the Round-Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and
Peacekeeping Post Cold War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 4/2 (1993), 229. For a
recent discussion with ample references see David Betz, ‘Insurgency and Counter-
insurgency’, in Robert Denemark et al. (eds.), The International Studies Encyclopedia,
Blackwell Reference Online, 5http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?
id¼g9781444336597_chunk_g978144433659711_ss1-104.
250 Bruno C. Reis
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
B-
on
 C
on
so
rt
iu
m 
- 
20
07
] 
At
: 
18
:0
2 
26
 A
pr
il
 2
01
1
confusing.17 However, this is not the same as arguing that military
thinking or more informal aspects of military culture are unimportant;
rather, it is an argument for definitional clarity.
Traditionally, studies of military doctrine have concentrated on
nuclear or conventional warfare thus following a wider pattern in
strategic studies. For a long time, small colonial wars were apparently
considered to be too small and too peripheral to deserve much notice in
security studies.18 This article hopes to help redress that imbalance.19
Why is doctrine relevant? In debating the centrality of minimum
force in British counterinsurgency it is crucial to establish whether or
not this principle was present in the main official guidelines issued
specifically to deal with guerrilla warfare in such paradigmatic
campaigns as Malaya and Kenya. It seems highly unlikely that a
disciplined organisation like the Armed Forces, which requires intensive
training and a hierarchical chain of command, would issue new
counterinsurgency guidelines in the middle of ongoing campaigns yet
somehow failed to include the allegedly central principle of minimum
force. It is also hardly credible to claim that these new manuals,
developed to deal specifically with ongoing counterinsurgencies, had no
significant connection with lessons learned or existing practices.
Given the specific aim of our analysis, this article will primarily focus
on the first of these two elements, i.e., on establishing the nonexistence
of a principle of minimum force in British doctrine for counter-
insurgency between 1945 and 1970 because this wrong starting point,
is seemingly accepted by even those critical of the minimum force
paradigm. Consequently, the crucial evidence required to make our
case will come from manuals. But some attention will be given to other
evidence of practices from other relevant sources: books of military
thinkers, memoirs and archival documents.
To evaluate the impact of minimum force, we must first understand
what the concept means. This doctrinal principle emerged in Britain in
the early nineteenth century as part of a process of political liberalisation
17See, e.g., Keith Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small
Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder: Westview 2001), 4–7; Paul Dixon, ‘‘‘Hearts and
Minds?’’ British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, Journal of Strategic Studies,
32/3 (2009), 357.
18Michael Howard, ‘The Military Factor in European Expansion’, in H. Bull (ed.), The
Expansion of European Society (Oxford: Clarendon P 1984), 34–35.
19For data on this imbalance, see Ian Beckett, ‘Low-Intensity Conflict: Its Place in the
Study of War’, in D.A. Charters et al. (eds), Military History and the Military
Profession (Westport: Praeger 1992), 121–9; for plausible explanations of this fact, see
John Shy and Thomas Collier, ‘Revolutionary War’, in P. Paret (ed.), Makers of
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon P 1986),
815–62.
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and, consequently, of softening of political repression. It required British
officers to deal with internal unrest with the minimum force necessary in
a given context, and it necessarily begs the questions: minimum in
relation to what maximum, and necessary under what circumstances? As
General Napier put it in 1837, using minimum force to deal with unrest
in Britain placed him in a predicament: ‘Should I be shot for
my forbearance by a court martial, or hanged for over zeal by a jury?’20
The intrinsically flexible and contextual nature of the concept of
minimum force is especially relevant in a colonial context. Even
in peacetime, British colonies were not models of democratic govern-
ance; therefore minimum force, particularly overseas, could
‘stray perilously close to merely rewriting the laws to cover any required
actions’.21 Minimum necessary force could, even in principle, mean
using quite a lot of force legally. But the problem with minimum force in
British counterinsurgency overseas after 1945 was more fundamental
than this.
Minimum Force Missing from British Counterinsurgency Doctrine
This section looks at the basic British guidelines for counterinsurgency
after 1945 and examines why they do not fit the traditional paradigm,
which gives a central role to minimum force. This analysis will focus on
the most doctrinally relevant British campaigns – Malaya (1948–60)
and Kenya (1952–60) – both of which resulted in important counter-
insurgency manuals. Another crucial source will be the first generic
British manual specifically devoted to counterinsurgency. Issued in
1970, i.e., at the very end of the period of decolonisation, it provides an
official summary of doctrinal developments during this period.
The Absence of Minimum Force from Counterinsurgency Manuals
Manuals dealing with counterinsurgency between 1945 and 1970
should be the starting point for any analysis of the role of minimum
force in the British small wars of decolonisation. They contain the
doctrinal guidelines developed to deal authoritatively and specifically
with counterinsurgency during this period. However, when we focus on
these principles minimum force is nowhere to be seen: it is absent from
the Malaya and Kenya campaign manuals, as well as from the first
generic manual on counterinsurgency.
But if minimum force is so completely absent from official guidelines,
where does the reference to its centrality come from? It comes from
20Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, 20.
21Ibid., 23.
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doctrinal guidelines on the use of military force in aid to the civil power
in response to lesser internal security challenges. This confusion
probably arises for two main reasons: first, the absence of a generic
doctrine dealing specifically with counterinsurgency before 1970;
second, the fact that insurgencies tended to be downplayed in official
discourse for political reasons as mere internal security problems, even
if the military did not treat them as such for long.
The nature of the connection of this body of doctrine on aid to the
civil power with counterinsurgency specifically is therefore essential in
establishing the role of minimum force in late colonial British small
wars. Mockaitis, a key advocate of the minimalist view of British
counterinsurgency in the period of interest to us, argues that ‘the
principle of minimum force was broadened further in 1949’ with a new
manual on Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power
resulting in a very significant ‘combination in one manual of what had
previously been handled in two’.22 This is wrong, not only because this
combination was more a matter of addition than of effective fusion –
more than half of the pages of the 1949 manual were specifically
focused on deployments within the United Kingdom only;23 but
also because the allegedly straightforward connection between internal
security doctrine and counterinsurgency during the small wars of
decolonisation is extremely problematic, to say the least. As was
bluntly noted by a keen observer of military doctrine at the time of
these campaigns – an author therefore free from any present-day
analytical bias on this matter – counterinsurgency after 1945 was ‘a
very different problem from the gesticulating, half-comic figures of the
traditional mob familiar from generations of Staff College ‘‘playlets’’
on ‘‘duties in aid of the civil power’’. Buglers and banners inscribed
‘‘Disperse or I fire’’ . . . were of marginal use in these vicious little
wars.’24 But what were then the doctrinal principles developed to deal
specifically with small wars after 1945?
British Counterinsurgency Manuals and the Use of Force
Before 1970 only campaign manuals for Malaya and Kenya dealt
specifically with counterinsurgency. These doctrinal rules of engage-
ment in the case of Malaya and Kenya actually gave a great deal of
22Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919–1960 (London: Macmillan
1990), 134.
23War Office, Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (London: HMSO
1949), ch. III.
24Alun Jones, ‘Training and Doctrine in the British Army since 1945’, in M. Howard
(ed.), The Theory and Practice of War (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1965), 318.
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leeway to British troops. This is also the case in other less well-known
and less successful – significantly both in terms of doctrinal develop-
ment and practice – British campaigns of decolonisation, such as those
that took place in Palestine or Cyprus.25
The manuals developed specifically for counterinsurgency did reflect
the legal concerns of British military culture, but not in a way that can
be equated with minimum force. In the Malayan campaign manual
there was a detailed section devoted to Emergency Regulations.
However, the dominant tone was enabling not restrictive: it was
oriented towards showing how this special legislation could be put to
the best possible operational use.26 These regulations included: the
right to shoot without warning in war areas; or in all areas after due
warning; or in order to prevent captured insurgents from escaping,
which amounted to a potential blank cheque for summary executions;
as well as virtually unlimited powers of detention, deportation,
resettlement and collective punishment. The Malayan campaign
manual was restrictive mainly with regard to respect for local customs,
e.g., in dealings with halal food or local women. It is true that in its
second edition the manual explicitly warned against confessions
obtained by resorting to any ‘inducement, threat or promise’ and
insisted that after an area had been cleared for military operations it
should not be regarded as a free shooting zone.27 This is significant not
only because it shows that these problems were sufficiently common to
deserve explicit reference in an attempt to impose greater restraint but
also because it did not make any reference to a principle of minimum
force in order to justify or clarify this doctrinal revision.
Kenya provides especially relevant evidence of the far-from-
straightforward nature of the relationship between doctrinal principles
for counterinsurgency and those of minimum force in doctrine
concerning aid to the civil power. When the insurgency started, in
1952, a revised version of the 1945 edition of the local manual with
25A point made by some historians of the British Empire, e.g., Ronald Hyam, Britain’s
Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006), 36,
57, 264 passim; on brutal repression and official counterterror in Palestine see, e.g.,
Jacob Norris, ‘Repression and Rebellion: Britain’s Response to the Arab Revolt in
Palestine of 1936–39’, Journal of Commonwealth Imperial History, 36/1 (2008), 26;
Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete (New York: Owl Books 2001), 415–35; Charles
Townshend, ‘In Aid of the Civil Power: Britain, Ireland, and Palestine 1948’, in D.
Marston et al. (eds), Counterinsurgency in UK-Modern Warfare (Wellingborough:
Osprey 2008), 31–32; for Cyprus see Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus
1954–1959 (Oxford: Clarendon P 1998).
26UK – HQ-Malaya Command, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya
(ATOM), 2nd Rev. Ed. (Kuala-Lumpur: HQ-MC 1954), ch. IV.
27Ibid., ch. IV/1.
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Instruction on the Use of Armed Force in Civil Disturbances was ready
to be issued. However, the military authorities objected to its
publication at a time of full-blown insurgency. Why? Because it would
create doctrinal confusion. Clearly, there was no straight path, quite
the opposite, between the doctrinal principles of minimum force
regarding internal security and counterinsurgency proper.28
The campaign report of the top British commander in Kenya,
General Erskine, who is usually credited with winning the campaign
against the Mau Mau, helps us to go deeper into the problematic nature
of the traditional paradigm of minimum force as central in British
counterinsurgency. He states that only in so-called ‘special Areas’,
marginal to the core areas of counterinsurgency proper, did security
forces have to act ‘selectively’ and ‘use the minimum force as judged by
the Officer in Command’. And even in these areas ‘anybody could be
called on to halt for purpose of examination and if the person did not
halt after challenged, fire could be opened’. But more importantly for
the argument of this article, General Erskine also states that ‘the most
important of these [Emergency] Regulations provided for Prohibited
Areas’ where ‘troops were able to operate on a straightforward war
basis’. These words show a revealing bias towards using force as
unconstrained as possible in counterinsurgency proper.29
Erskine’s testimony shows that while minimum force may sometimes
have been marginally present in late colonial British counterinsurgency
campaigns its importance has been widely exaggerated. For instance, in
the case of Kenya, it is clear that Erskine was determined to change his
troops’ modus operandi in order to make them more effective counter-
insurgents, commissioning a Handbook of new doctrinal guidelines
specifically for that purpose. But Erskine was unwilling to adopt
minimum force as the central doctrinal principle of his counter-
insurgency campaign, hence its total absence from that Handbook.
The evidence from the British campaign in Kenya leads us to concur
with the analysis that ‘the oft-assumed national inhibitor, the principle
of ‘‘minimum force’’, was actually’ in this case, but also in other British
small wars of decolonisation ‘widely permissive’; and that ‘harsh
measures were seen as necessary and effective’ and resulted from a
strategic option not ‘a disciplinary breakdown’. Therefore it seems
reasonable to conclude that indeed ‘it is time for a re-evaluation of the
significance of minimum force in British counterinsurgency, as
28TNA, WO 276/138, Internal Security Publications, e.g., Letter from E.W. Magor UK-
MoD Kenya to Mj. Gen. Heyman GHQ EAfrica (27 Aug. 1954).
29TNA, WO 236/18 Report on the Kenya Emergency Gen. Sir G. Erskine 7 May 1953–
25 May 1955. UK–East Africa-GHQ, A Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations
(Nairobi: EA-GHQ 1954).
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illustrated by the Kenya Emergency case’ in others cases.30 But this
article goes further than this by showing that this paradigm of the
centrality of minimum force was largely a myth, not only because of its
flexibility in practice, as Bennett claims, but also because of its absence
in late colonial doctrinal principles themselves.
The British manual on counterrevolutionary warfare which came out
in 1970 was the first to deal specifically and exclusively with
counterinsurgency outside of the context of a particular campaign,
therefore providing crucial evidence on the role of minimum force in
the canon of British counterinsurgency doctrine that emerged during
this period of decolonisation. If minimum force was in fact such a
central doctrinal principle, why is it not present where one would
expect to find it: in the list of four ‘Ingredients of Success for
Counterinsurgency’?31 Minimum force did not qualify for that
distinction or, in fact, for any mention. Furthermore, the section of
the 1970 manual that deals with ‘counter-ambush measures’ – a central
task in counterinsurgency – states that it ‘must be made clear to the
insurgents that any road ambushes will result in swift, devastating
retaliation from the security forces.’ This is in obvious contradiction
with the way that minimum force in British counterinsurgency has
traditionally been portrayed in stark contrast with French counter-
insurgency’s emphasis on retaliation.32
Minimum Force: Doctrine versus Practice?
This subsection seeks to counter an important counterargument against
the main claim of this article by those like Bennett who argue that there
was a very significant difference between doctrine and practice in
British counterinsurgency during decolonisation. To address this point
is even more important given the often mentioned pragmatism,
flexibility and anti-intellectualism of British officers.33
30Huw Bennett, ‘The Other Side of COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British
Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18/4 (2007), 638,
657.
31UK – Ministry of Defence, Land Operations: Vol. III: Counter-Revolutionary
Operations: Part 3. Counter Insurgency, Army Code 70516 (Part 3) (London: HMSO
Jan. 1970), 4–5.
32UK – Ministry of Defence, Land Operations: Vol. III: Counter-Revolutionary
Operations: Part 3. Counter Insurgency, Army Code 70516 (Part 3) (London: HMSO
Jan. 1970), 57.
33See, e.g., John Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam:
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport: Praeger 2002), 36–7 passim.
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Two lectures on counterinsurgency given by General Stockwell in a
relatively short period of time offer a rare glimpse into the difficult issue
of the relationship between principles and practices during the period
when the earliest efforts were being made to develop a new doctrine to
deal specifically with counterinsurgency. In 1950 and again in 1953, he
was invited to deliver lectures at the Staff College on counterinsurgency
in Palestine and Malaya. The approach he took on the two occasions
varied significantly. In 1950, Stockwell felt obliged to warn that he was
merely offering ‘a colour picture as a background to your study of
Internal Security duties’; i.e., ‘particular examples’ from Palestine
should not distract officers from the ‘study of the pamphlet – Imperial
Policing’ as the only authorised source of ‘general principles’.34
This might be read as an unequivocal endorsement of official doctrine
on aid to civil power. But the terms in which it was made, and
especially a second lecture on the same subject only a few years later,
point to a growing tension between the need for new specific guidelines
based on practical lessons learned from fighting insurgencies on the
ground, and the old official guidelines developed not for counter-
insurgency proper but for lighter internal security duties.
Indeed, in Stockwell’s next lecture on the same subject, in 1953, he
used the new formal doctrine developed to deal specifically with
counterinsurgency, even if, stricto sensu, the authority of these new
guidelines was limited to Malaya. Yet Stockwell’s notes show that in
presenting the lessons learned in the case of counterinsurgency in
Malaya he chose not only to follow closely the manual developed
for that campaign, but also not to make any reference to other
sources of doctrine.35 This provides early evidence of the impact of
ATOM (with its absence of minimum force) at the heart of the British
Army establishment, even if ‘not until 1961 was the Malayan manual
put on the syllabus at Camberley’.36
Stockwell’s lectures also show the limits of the often mentioned
pragmatism, informality, and flexibility of British officers. In this case,
even a very senior officer clearly subordinated his experience to formal
guidelines. These lectures also help to document the importance of the
development of specific guidelines for counterinsurgency based on
ongoing campaigns in the 1950s. After all, why would new manuals be
34NAM, Templer Papers 7410-29-1-10, LHCMA-KCL LH 1/682 Letter Templer to
Liddell Hart LHCMA – KCL, Stockwell Papers 7/4 LHCMA-KCL, Stockwell Papers,
6/29/2, I.S. Lecture Staff College [Mar. 1950].
35LHCMA-KCL, Stockwell Papers, 6/3, Training for Anti-Guerrilla Warfare (s.d.),
IDEM, Stockwell Papers, 6/7, Vade-Mecum: The Army in the Cold War Operations
(Malaya).
36Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 134.
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developed specifically for counterinsurgency in Malaya and Kenya if
preexisting doctrine on internal security had been adequate? The same
logic would force us to recognise the very real significance of the fact
that minimum force played no part in manuals on counterinsurgency
proper during the most successful British campaigns in Malaya and
Kenya.
Moreover, minimum force is also significantly absent from the books
published by the major British military thinkers on counterinsurgency
during this period. This is especially significant for two reasons. First,
because these authors – Kitson, Paget and Thompson being probably
the most well-known – were deeply involved in developing and
applying as well as publicly promoting the British approach to
counterinsurgency. Any alleged informal or semiformal doctrine of
minimum force should therefore logically find some expression in their
work. If it is neither there nor in official guidelines, then where is
minimum force in counterinsurgency during this period between 1945
and 1970? Second, because, in publishing books accessible to the
general public, these authors would have a strong incentive to underline
any softer, more acceptable side of British counterinsurgency. Yet
minimum force is nowhere to be found.
General Kitson, when asked by the Ministry of Defence in the early
1970s to devote one year to the writing of a book summarising his vast
experience of counterinsurgency going back to Kenya in the early
1950s, did not make a single reference to minimum force. He did
believe that ‘politicians’ would seek to ‘avoid the use of force’ in
dealing with internal disturbances, but he also made clear that ‘there
are military difficulties in using too little force and about delaying its
application for too long’. Moreover, Kitson insisted that ‘however great
the restrictions imposed on the use of force’ still ‘every effort’ should be
made by the military ‘to build an impression of strength’.37
On the basis of his Malayan experience, Sir Robert Thompson did
insist that the temptation to simply ignore the law was a serious
strategic mistake in counterinsurgency. But not only was the principle
of minimum force absent from Thompson’s texts, namely from his
influential list of five key ingredients for victory in counterinsurgency,
he also made clear that his concern was motivated by the need to fight
an insurgency by building a stronger state, which should be done by
toughening the law according to strategic necessity, not by acting in a
blindly violent way.38 Even in a later work, aimed at convincing
37Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping
(London: Faber and Faber 1971), 3, 69–70, 90.
38Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and
Vietnam (London: Chatto and Windus 1966), 50–5.
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Western audiences of the need to stay in Vietnam, Thompson did not
insert any reference to the ability to win a counterinsurgency using
minimum force, which, given the apologetic purpose of the book would
be very convenient.39
Despite all this, if British troops had no authoritative doctrine
specifically for counterinsurgency – which with the exception of
Malaya and Kenya was the case until the generic manual of 1970 was
issued – one could still ask whether minimum force might have been
employed by default.
A recent documentary series on the British wars of decolonisation
offers significant evidence that this was not the case, with important
testimonies from all the major campaigns about deadly special
operations and other examples of major use of force; no less revealing
are some refusals to talk about more controversial issues justified by the
need to leave certain things unsaid.40 In answering this question the
failed British counterinsurgency campaign in Aden and South Arabia
(1963–67) is especially important, because it took place after the
successful counterinsurgencies in Malaya and Kenya, in which theatre-
specific doctrine had been developed, but before an Army-wide doctrine
on counterinsurgency was issued in 1970. A new study of the military
campaign in South Arabia ‘depressingly’ but significantly concluded
that there was a lack of any visible significant learning by the British
army either from experience or from other previous counterinsurgency
campaigns.41 This should make us question the extent to which
‘imperial networking provided a kind of doctrinal continuity’ of
British counterinsurgency principles, regardless of whether or not it
included minimum force.42 More importantly for the central argument
of this article, the campaign in South Arabia provides strong evidence
that it is wrong to claim that in the absence of specific counter-
insurgency guidelines minimum force would prevail by default. Colonel
Julian Paget, who played a central role in that campaign, leaves no
room for doubt:
Internal Security operations, otherwise known as duties in aid of
the Civil Power, are not to be confused with counterinsurgency;
they are aimed at controlling civil disturbances and are based on
39Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New York: David MacKay 1969), 163.
40Jenny Ash, Empire Warriors (London: BBC 2004) [2 DVDs – 2006], the four
episodes are on Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Aden and South Arabia.
41Jonathan Walker, Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia 1962–1967
(Staplehurst: Spellmount 2005), 288.
42Townshend, ‘In Aid of the Civil Power’, 36.
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principles of the use of minimum force, which does not apply in
actions against insurgents.43
There is no indication that he regarded this matter-of-fact statement as in
any way controversial, much less contrary to a British Army norm.
Therefore, in Aden, the last major British small war of decolonisation,
minimum force is for the most part invisible, in principle as well as in
practice, despite the fact that this was already a highly mediatised
campaign taking place as late as the late 1960s. And yet the persistent
nature of the minimum force paradigm, even among authors who are
more critical of an increasingly incredible softly, softly portrayal of
British counterinsurgency doctrine, is demonstrated by the fact that a
recent article, which adopts a moderately revisionist point of view,
somehow still cites Paget as evidence of the principle of minimum force in
British counterinsurgency.44
An important point on the question of the relationship between
doctrine and practice in these counterinsurgency campaigns is the fact
that small wars, as General Erskine’s Foreword to the Kenyan campaign
Handbook states, place ‘much responsibility on junior leaders and even
individual soldiers’.45 But this does not necessarily contradict the need for
formal doctrine. As Thompson highlighted, this was a ‘junior comman-
der’s war’ but ‘no junior commanders would dare to take action
without superior orders’.46 It was precisely for this reason that counter-
insurgency manuals were so important. They helped to make clear that
lower and middle-ranking officers were expected to play an active role in
counterinsurgency, while offering them some generic guidelines on how
best to proceed in this very unconventional type of conflict.
Another crucial point regarding the relationship between combat
experience and doctrine is made by the most emblematic figure of
British counterinsurgency, General Templer, who states in the opening
lines of the famous manual he sponsored:
I have been impressed by the wealth of jungle fighting experience
available on different levels in Malaya . . . I have been disturbed by the
fact that this . . . has not been properly collated or presented to those
whoseknowledgeandexperience isnot so great. . . .Hence thisbook.47
43Julian Paget, Counterinsurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber 1967), 15.
44Dixon, ‘‘‘Hearts and Minds?’’’, 359.
45George Erskine, ‘Foreword’, in A Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations (Nairobi:
EA-GHQ 1954).
46Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 61.
47Sir Gerald Templer, ‘Foreword’, in The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in
Malaya [ATOM] (Kuala-Lumpur: HQ-MC 1954), xi.
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This quintessential example of British counterinsurgency doctrine
explicitly pooled, reflected upon and distributed lessons gained from
combat experience. In other words, doctrine does not emerge out of
nowhere. The best way to account for the absence of minimum force
from British doctrinal principles and military thinking on counter-
insurgency during these crucial years of its development is therefore
simply to conclude that this reflected and reinforced the fact that
minimum force was not present, in so far as we can document it, in
most of British practice in the small wars of decolonisation. Or as an
internal British Army document put it as late as 1972, counter-
insurgency was defined as ‘military activities involving the restoration
of law and order which are NOT conducted in accordance with the
principle of minimum force’.48
Comparing British with French and Portuguese Counterinsurgency
Doctrines
Is British population-centric doctrine, however, still fundamentally
different from other examples of counterinsurgency? This section will
provide evidence for a negative answer to that question regarding
doctrinal developments in nearly contemporary small wars of
decolonisation. The focus will be on the French case – so often cited,
and so often quickly dismissed – but some references will also be made,
when pertinent, to the Portuguese case.
Winning Local Hearts and Minds is Not a British Specificity
A notion closely linked with British counterinsurgency and minimum
force is a slogan popularised by General Templer during the Malayan
campaign: ‘the answer to our present problems and frustrations . . . lies
in the hearts and minds of the men, women and children of this
country’.49 But how specifically British is this population-centric
concern with winning over local civilians as vital to victory in
counterinsurgency?
A very similar concern with gaining the support of the local
population, and not merely killing insurgents or brutally coercing
civilians was also an essential part of both the French and Portuguese
counterinsurgency guidelines issued in the 1950s and 1960s. It is even
48TNA, WO 32/21748 Counter Revolutionary Operations Study, Directorate of Army
Training, Note on Terminology (13 Oct. 1972, emphasis in original).
49NAM, Templer Papers 7410-29-1-10, Gerald Templer – Address to the [Malayan]
Chamber of Commerce (25 Apr. 1952). The audience of businessmen is also significant:
they could help him in this regard, by improving the lot of the common people.
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possible to argue that in both the French and Portuguese cases, this
concern with winning over locals played a more central role than it did
in the British case, or at least led to a greater transformation of the
military.
Entirely new (fifth) sections in charge of civilian affairs and
psychological warfare were created in military HQs in both the French
and Portuguese armies. These tasks were seen as so vital for success that
French and Portuguese military leaders felt that they had to control
them and take them into consideration when planning and executing all
counterinsurgency operations. More importantly for the key concern of
this article, specific Portuguese and French military doctrine on
psychological warfare was developed to provide guidance to officers
dealing with civilian affairs and propaganda.50
The official lessons of the French campaign in Indochina had concluded
that the failure there had largely been due to the absence of this
population-centric dimension, despite some belated steps to develop it,
‘hampered by lack of adequate personnel’.51 As a consequence, a new
body of French civilian affairs officers was created in Algeria building
upon an older tradition of colonial pacification but employing a new
manual written specifically to make sure that they would be doctrinally
equipped to fight a revolutionary war for the hearts and minds of
Algerians.52 French doctrine on psychological warfare then had an
important influence in the development of Portuguese doctrine.53
Total War as the French Comprehensive Approach to
Counterinsurgency
Can a population-centric understanding of counterinsurgency be
reconciled with the French notion of counterinsurgency as total war?
This article will argue that, in fact, it was an indispensable part of it.
50SHD 1H 2403 Commander-in-Chief X RM-EM, Directive pour l’Action Psycholo-
gique . . . (2 July 1955); SHD 1H 2408, EMGFA-BP, Directive sur la Guerre
Psychologique (4 Oct. 1955). Two important works of reference are: Pierre Pahlavi, La
guerre re´volutionnaire de l’arme´e franc¸aise en Alge´rie (1954–1961): Entre esprit de
conqueˆte et conqueˆte des esprits (Paris: L’Harmattan 2002); and Paul and Marie
Villatoux, La Republique et son arme´e face au peril subversif: guerre et action
psychologiques en France, 1945–1960 (Paris: Les Indes Savantes 2005).
5110H 346 EMIFT, Note de service 800 (4 Apr. 1953); see also SHD 10H 983 EMAT,
Enseignements de la Guerre d’Indochine, Vol. 2: 11–29, 68. Raoul Salan, Me´moires:
Fin d’un Empire, (Paris: Presses de la Cite´ 1970), Vol. 2, 306–9.
52France-Ministe`re de l’Alge´rie-Service Affaires Alge´riennes, Guide de l’officier des
affaires alge´riennes (Paris: SAA 1959).
53Portugal-EME, O Exe´rcito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive Warfare]
(EGS), 5 vols. (Lisboa: EME-IAEM 1963), Vol. 3, chs. III to VI.
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Formal French counterinsurgency training guidelines, under the title
‘Permanent Factors of Success’, stated unequivocally that: ‘this war is
total. It must include all fronts simultaneously . . . ; in the same way as
all military actions have an operational dimension, they also have a
psychological dimension and a pacification dimension.’54 This was
translated in the very population-centric notion of ‘war among the
people’.55 These were recurrent themes in French texts on counter-
insurgency, particularly in the Revue Militaire d’Information (RMI), a
professional military journal charged with promoting counterinsur-
gency. Some of these articles were then included in the syllabus of the
main French counterinsurgency training centre in Algeria. This was
natural given the fact that both RMI and the Arzew centre were initially
under the head of the new Fifth Section of the French General Staff,
Colonel Lacheroy, a determined advocate of the population-centric
dimension of counterinsurgency warfare.56
French promoters of counterinsurgency doctrine had no doubt that
‘revolutionary warfare’ – their preferred label for counterinsurgency as
a highly politicised type of conflict – was ‘the real total war’, requiring
comprehensive ‘physical and moral mobilisation of the population’ and
‘a strictly coordinated and energetic action’ by all state agents. For
counterinsurgency to be total it had to include ‘energetic propaganda’
to recover the loyalty of the local population.57 The inevitable question
then becomes how can the French Army use of brutal methods in
counterinsurgency be reconciled with this population-centric counter-
insurgency doctrine of total warfare?
Coercion in Population-Centric Doctrine
That French counterinsurgents often resorted to brutal methods is
unquestionable. General Aussaresses, who was in charge of special
operations during the Battle of Algiers (1957), was only the latest
and possibly the most extreme example of a relatively long series of
very outspoken testimonies by French officers. Aussaresses took pride
in describing his role in the summary executions of captured
Algerian insurgent leaders, because he believed this was necessary
54SHD 1H 2524, XRM – CIPCG (Arzew), L’Activite´ Operationnelle en Alge´rie, 2.
55E.g., Col. Nemo, ‘La Guerre dans le Milieu Sociale’, Revue de De´fense Nationale, 12
(1956), 622.
56For an obviously partial but rich account see Charles Lacheroy, De Saint-Cyr a` la
Guerre Psychologique: Me´moires d’un Sie`cle (Panazol: Lavauzelle 2003).
57A. Sourys, ‘Les conditions de la parade et de la riposte a` la guerre re´volutionnaire’,
Revue Militaire d’Information, 281 (1957), 92.
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to win an unconventional war.58 But Colonel Trinquier, one of the
most influential officers in the development and implementation of
counterinsurgency guidelines in Algeria, had written decades before:
‘I am neither in favour nor against torture . . ., in the same way as I
am neither in favour nor against conventional weapons.’59 General
Salan, the French Commander-in-Chief in Algeria (1956–58), had
also recorded in his memoirs a tense exchange of views with General
de la Bollardie`re: the latter resigning because he did not want to
fight a ‘dirty war’; Salan merely replying that ‘it is one imposed on
us by the enemy’.60
The total warfare mindset does seem to have contributed to the
acceptance of a significant level of coercion as a military necessity in
French counterinsurgency, leading to statements like the following by
General E´ly, the last French supremo in Indochina and Chief-of-the-
General-Staff during most of the Algerian War: ‘we do not accept any
limits other than the ones the enemy accepts for himself’.61 But to
reduce the French conception of counterinsurgency as a total war to a
blind focus on enemy-centric kinetic action and an absence of concern
for winning over the local population is facile but wrong. The very
same General E´ly told a President de Gaulle who was eager to see the
return of French troops to strictly military roles that the new
population-centric tasks performed by officers were vital: ‘how could
we replace all these men by civilians? It is impossible!’62 For French
military chiefs, accepting no limits on counterinsurgents other than
those of the insurgents also meant expanding the role of the military
into population-centric tasks.
However, for the core argument of this article, the key point is not
whether French counterinsurgency was violent in absolute terms, but
rather how it compared with British small wars of decolonisation in
terms of doctrinal principles and military practices. A number of recent
books by French scholars on France’s decolonisation campaigns
carefully document some of the more violent aspects of French
counterinsurgency and would therefore seem to vindicate the prevailing
narrative of post-1945 counterinsurgency with France – alongside the
58Paul Aussaresses, Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture (New York:
Enigma 2005).
59Roger Trinquier, La Guerre, (Paris: Albin Michel 1980), 173.
60Salan, Me´moires, Vol. 3, 76.
61General Paul E´ly, ‘Preface’, Reglement de l’Action Psychologique, in M. Faivre (ed.),
Le Ge´ne´ral Paul E´ly et la Politique de De´fense (1956–1961) (Paris: Economica 1998
[Orig. Ed. 1958]), 14.
62Cited in Maurice Faivre (ed.), Le Ge´ne´ral Paul E´ly et la Politique de De´fense (1956–
1961) (Paris: Economica 1998), 77, reproduces E´ly’s diary of 5 Mar. 1960.
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US – playing villain to Britain’s hero.63 However, these French studies
do not aim at a comparative approach that would give traction to
arguments about a sharp contrast between French and British
counterinsurgency; and focus systematically on abuses by the France’s
military, something only now starting to be done for the British case.
The main French training centre in Algeria, it should be made clear,
did include some notions of military justice, namely with regard to
proper arrest, even though this seems to have been an addition to the
initial version.64 However, one central point in French doctrinal texts
was that peacetime legislation should not be allowed to provide cover
for subversion. Colonel Lacheroy, in a core text on the syllabus of
the Arzew training centre, made this clear by contrasting the
‘debonair justice system in a venal democracy’ with the ideal for
revolutionary warfare of a ‘popular-political-military dictatorship,
relatively pure, always hard, and if necessary brutal’.65
In view of this, it should come as no surprise that in French doctrine
the military necessity of finding and fighting insurgents prevailed over
the requirements of a liberal democracy. But what this meant was that
the French Army was granted special legal powers that allowed it to
keep in detention suspected insurgents for up to a month without
charges, and a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy that opened the door to all
kinds of abuses.
This is not very different, however, from British counterinsurgency
use of emergency regulations as illustrated in the Malayan campaign
manual and pointedly exemplified by Sir Robert Thompson: ‘strict
curfews, a mandatory death penalty for carrying arms, life imprison-
ment for providing supplies or other support to the terrorists’.66
Moreover, recent studies document an initial period when the top
British official in Malaya went so far as to advocate the need to break
the law in order to defeat the insurgents.67 Decades later, General
63Particularly in-depth – and with references to Indochina – is Rapha¨ele Branche, La
Torture et l’Arme´e pendant la Guerre d’Alge´rie (1954–1962) (Paris: Gallimard 2001),
424–35; see also, on how the legal system dealt with the war, Sylvie The´nault, Une
Droˆle de Justice: Les Magistrats dans la Guerre d’Alge´rie (Paris: La De´couverte 2004).
For a rare example of some resistance to this trend, see Henri le Mire, Histoire Militaire
de la Guerre d’Alge´rie (Paris: Albin Michel 1982), 105–16 passim.
64SHD 1H 1115, XRM–CIPCG, Dossier d’Instruction, 130–31. All sections in this
instruction manual are numbered in sequence, except this one: 51 bis.
65SHD 1H 2524, XRM – CIPCG (Arzew), Charles Lacheroy, La Guerre Re´volution-
naire: Lec¸ons de l’action Viet-minh et communiste en Indochine.
66Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 52–3.
67E.g., Huw Bennett, ‘‘‘A very salutary effect’’: The Counter-Terror Strategy in the
Early Malayan Emergency, June 1948 to December 1949’, Journal of Strategic Studies,
32/3 (2009), 433.
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Kitson was still highlighting the need for British counterinsurgency to
close the legal ‘loophole concerning disorder which is not aimed at
overthrowing the government’ and armed insurgency.68
And the last major British decolonisation campaign in Aden in the
mid-1960s offers some parallels, if not in scale, certainly in dynamics,
rationale and political attitudes with the French campaign in Algiers.
Namely, a specialised interrogation unit in the main detention centre
for suspected insurgents in Aden became the focus of accusations of
torture.69 Despite the damning conclusions of the so-called Bowden
Report, the official argument from the Army remained that even if there
had been a ‘large number of allegation and many were of a serious
nature’ and they were ‘not dealt expeditiously’ there was good reason
for this. The only use of ‘minimum necessary force’ I could find in
documents pertaining to this campaign was in justifying ‘raids’ that
were deemed excessively brutal by the report. The top British official in
Aden sums it up by reacting to the report by emphasising that: ‘the only
instrument by which the Government could make itself aware of
terrorists’ intentions was the interrogation Centre. It was therefore of
overriding important that nothing should be done that might hamper
the operations of the Centre’ namely insurgent ‘propaganda’ targeting
it.70
Furthermore, some authors, including Rod Thornton who advocates
the centrality of minimum force in British counterinsurgency, have
argued that brutal interrogation methods, though kept out of formal
guidelines, were nonetheless common practice throughout British small
wars, being transmitted informally between interrogators. If this is
confirmed by further research, it can be seen as an additional sign of the
underdevelopment of doctrine in fields outside of conventional warfare;
and evidence of a greater reluctance to set down guidelines concerning
this particularly sensitive area, even in classified manuals; as well as,
again, a very coercive side to British counterinsurgency.71
68Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 3.
69Julien Paget, Last Post: Aden 1964–1967 (London: Faber and Faber 1969), 128–9.
70Roderick Bowen, Report on Procedures for the Arrest, Interrogation and Detention
of Suspected Terrorists in Aden (London: HMSO 1966); see also TNA: citations from
DEFE 24/253 UK-Army, Comments of the Section of the Bowen Report Entitled
‘Allegations of Cruelty and Torture’: Idem, H.C. Turnbull, Note on the Security
Situation in Aden in December (25 Jan. 1966);
71Rod Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes in Early Stages of the British
Deployment in the Northern Ireland Campaign (August 1969 to March 1972)’, Journal
of Strategic Studies, 30/1 (2007), 94 and footnote 104; see also Peter Taylor, Brits: The
War against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury 2001), 65.
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As for Portugal, one influential officer in the development of
Portuguese counterinsurgency doctrine, Colonel Hermes Oliveira, went
so far as to criticise as a fatal weakness Western legal concerns
regarding the treatment of insurgents.72 Official Portuguese military
doctrine highlighted ‘a growing difficulty in suffocating brutally any
kind of protest of the people against their own government, because of
the repercussions that this has on global public opinion as well as
internally’.73 Clearly, even authoritarian Western states such as
Portugal could be concerned with an excessive use of force, if only
for the negative impact on national and international public opinion;
but not to the point of endangering the perceived priority of getting
vital intelligence. Portuguese counterinsurgency guidelines stated that
although it was important for troops engaged in counterinsurgency to
know and observe the law, ‘ordinary law could be modified’ by special
legislation adapted to a ‘state of siege’.74 Furthermore, Portuguese
doctrine, as in the other two cases, established relatively lax rules for
the treatment of alleged insurgents. Even if a generic principle of
‘humane treatment’ was affirmed, it was stressed that, unlike regular
troops protected by the Geneva Convention, ‘it is very hard in
subversive warfare to establish the exact status of captured comba-
tants’.75 The order of priorities governing the treatment of prisoners
according to Portuguese doctrine should be to: ‘make sure they do not
escape or are released’; ‘obtain the maximum of information’; ‘turn
them for future use’; ‘avoid resentment from innocent prisoners’.76
It is clear therefore that a concern with the population-centric
dimension of counterinsurgency was present in doctrinal guidelines in
the three cases being analysed, but that very coercive measures were
still allowed if they were seen as strategically necessary. Liberal
democratic states could hardly advocate torture openly; in fact, it seems
unlikely that any kind of state would do that, even if only out of
concern with its external image. But, of course, doctrinal military
guidelines were not public. Discretion would still probably seem wise,
and a lot could be left unsaid if formal guidelines – as was the case of
counterinsurgency doctrines in all three cases – pointed in certain
directions, namely: how vital it was to get timely intelligence; the
possibility of changing the law to enable harsher measures of
72Hermes de A. Oliveira, Guerra Revoluciona´ria (Lisboa: [s.n.] 1962), 229–30.
73Portugal-EME, O Exe´rcito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive Warfare],
Vol. 1, xi.
74Ibid., Vol. 4, I/3. Significantly this is the very same page where the principle of
minimum force is mentioned.
75Ibid., Vol. 5, I/8–9.
76Ibid., Vol. 5, I/8–9.
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population control and punishment; the lack of clarity regarding the
status and treatment of captured insurgents.
One important question remains: why have instances of French
brutality in counterinsurgency campaigns, at least until recently, been
more widely known and discussed than their equivalents in British or
Portuguese campaigns? This may simply be because abuses were more
widespread and institutionalised in French counterinsurgency.77
Another factor also worth considering is the significantly greater
intensity of French counterinsurgency campaigns – adding urgency to
getting intelligence on the insurgents – in Indochina and Algeria when
compared with all other instances of small wars of decolonisation, and
particularly with the very low-intensity British campaign in Kenya.78
Still, even if French counterinsurgency was more coercive for whatever
reasons, why would French officers not be brutal but silent? A
possibility worth considering is the greatly polarised nature of French
political culture, with, on the one hand, a cult of the state and of salut
public as the embodiment of national security; and, on the other, a
tradition of public intellectuals openly challenging state security
concerns going back at least to Zola and the Dreyfus Affair.79 This
may help to explain both the relative abundance of candid testimonies
about brutal practices by French officers, who claimed that they were
doing what was necessary for state security reasons, alongside loud
public criticism of them as unacceptable violations of basic human
77Probably the first to make the case in these terms is Peter Paret, French Revolutionary
Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine
(London: Pall Mall P 1964), 104–5. But he is also careful to note that this does not
mean that a strong coercive dimension was exclusive to French counterinsurgency
campaigns.
78Cf. John Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–
1974 (Westport: Greenwood P 1997), 189, on data on deaths per day of war per
thousand combatants – 0.0017 British Malaya, 0.0075 Portuguese Africa, 0.0107
French Algeria, 0.0365 US war in Vietnam, 0.0691 French Indochina. Kenya was so
insignificant in this respect that it is not even listed by Cann and others; data is not
contested as to the number of British (63) and local allied combatants killed (1200), but
estimates range from 11,000 to 20,000 insurgents/suspects killed or even 100,000s, cf.
Daniel Branch, ‘The enemy within: loyalists and the way against Mau Mau in Kenya’,
Journal of African History, 48/2 (2007), 292 footnote 6.
79It is revealing that similar arguments regarding the prevalence of state security are
held by men with deeply opposed views on counterinsurgency in Algeria; Antoine
Argoud, La De´cadence, l’Imposture et la Trage´die (Paris: Fayard 1974), 157; and
General de Gaulle, cited in Alain Peyrefitte, C’E´tait de Gaulle (Paris: Fayard 1995),
126; for the denouncing of this Realpolitik by one of the most vocal intellectual critic of
the Algerian War see Pierre Vidal-Naquet, La Raison d’E´tat (Paris: La De´couverte
2002 [Orig. Ed. 1962]).
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rights. Mainstream British media and censored Portuguese media were
respectively less willing and unable to denounce excessive violence in
British and Portuguese counterinsurgencies.80
Bernard Fall refers to a French ‘Cartesian rationale for the use of
torture in revolutionary warfare’.81 This certainly produced murderous
results, namely in Algeria. But by using this expression Fall was
pointing to a larger issue that exists in counterinsurgency as an
intelligence-driven conflict in which fighting the enemy implies finding
him: sometimes there seems to be a strategic logic in using very violent
means to get vital information. In other words, the challenge of finding
insurgents without falling into abuses is not exclusive to past French
counterinsurgency.
Interestingly, both the concepts of minimum force and total warfare
were incorporated into the multivolume Portuguese manual on
counterinsurgency and internal security. This shows that a necessary
contradiction between them was not evident in the 1960s, if, as was the
case, minimum force was understood to be restricted to riot control,
not counterinsurgency proper and total warfare was equated with a
comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency.82
Doctrinal Definitions of Counterinsurgency
But how are we to define synthetically British counterinsurgency during
the wars of decolonisation if not in terms of minimum force and
winning hearts and minds? The best answer is to turn to the dominant
conceptualisation of counterinsurgency in British, as well as French and
Portuguese, doctrines during these decolonisation campaigns.
The main concern of British counterinsurgency was to develop a
civil-military, offence-defence, inkspot, state-building comprehensive
approach to counter insurgency at every level. The paradigmatic
example of this is the Briggs/Templer Plan for Malaya, an inkspot
strategy of pacification through clear-hold-build efforts systematically
targeting different regions.83 Sir Robert Thompson summarises it very
80On the normally close relationship between Whitehall and Fleet Street see Susan L.
Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial
Counterinsurgency, 1944–1960 (London: Leicester UP 1995), 266–7.
81Bernard Fall, ‘Introduction’, in Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of
Counterinsurgency (London: Pall Mall P 1964 [Orig. Fr. Ed. 1961]), xv.
82Portugal-EME, O Exe´rcito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive Warfare],
Vol. 4, II/22.
83TNA CAB 21/1681 Federation [of Malaya], Plan for the Elimination of the
Communist Organization and Armed Forces in Malaya [Briggs Plan]. See also The
Briggs Plan, UK-HQ-Malaya Command, III/2–5.
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aptly: to regain control of the country in ‘oil-spot’ offensives, i.e.,
‘secure your base areas first’ so as to control the most ‘highly developed
areas of the country’, and accept if need be penetration from
‘inaccessible borders’.84 The corollary of this, however, was not
minimum force, but that ‘clear operations will . . . be a waste of time
unless’ they are followed ‘immediately’ by ‘hold operations’, including
the establishment of strategic hamlets, local militias and strict control
of locals and vital commodities. Counterinsurgency was therefore
conceptualised as a ‘fight’ for the ‘control of the population’ in
‘clear-and-hold operations’.85
This has close parallels in French and Portuguese counterinsurgency
doctrine. In fact, the principle of tache d’huile/oil-spot for colonial
pacification was famously advocated back in the nineteenth century by
the French General Gallieni, and was exemplarily applied in the Algerian
War by General Challe.86 To quote Trinquier, French counterinsurgency
was conceived as a fight ‘against an armed clandestine organisation
whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population’, requiring
not spectacular ‘operational warfare’ but a slow effort ‘methodically
pursued’. He concluded that the insurgency ‘will not end until we have
organised the population and created an efficient intelligence service’.87
The Portuguese manual also made very clear that counterinsurgency
consisted of a systematic comprehensive struggle against the insurgents
and for the population; therefore, ‘the solution for this type of conflict
can never be obtained by armed force alone’.88
In terms of doctrinal development, the differences in regime-type
between the three cases seem, consequently, largely irrelevant. Portugal
had an authoritarian regime, but was part of the Western bloc and had
an interest in avoiding criticism from key allies. The Portuguese
government was therefore determined to show its ability to win over
84Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 57.
85Ibid., 111–12, 116.
86See, e.g., Douglas Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French
Colonial Warfare’, in P. Paret (ed.), Makers of UK-Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli
to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: OUP 1986), 389 passim; Franc¸ois-Marie Gougeon, ‘The
Challe Plan: Vain Yet Indispensable Victory’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 16/3
(2005), 293–316. Challe explains his approach and cites in extenso from key
documents in Maurice Challe, Notre Re´volte (Paris: Presses de la Cite´ 1968), 91–105;
see also SHD, 1H 1930, Note C-e-C X Region Militaire, 10 Dec. 1959, appendix La
Me´thode de pacification generale; Claude Delmas, ‘Interview avec le Ge´ne´rale Challe’,
Revue De´fense Nationale, 17 (1961), 577–94.
87Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (London:
Pall Mall P 1964 [Orig. Fr. Ed. 1961]), 8–9, 48–9.
88Portugal-EME, O Exe´rcito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive Warfare],
Vol. 1, xi.
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the local populations in its overseas territories. Britain and France were
democratic but also imperial powers, and an empire by definition is not
a liberal democratic regime – not even when the territories were
formally not colonies like Algeria – especially in times of crisis.
Differences in military capabilities also did not matter much, because
Portugal mobilised all available resources and drafted all available
manpower – making it the third most militarised country in the world;
and the insurgents it faced were still as a rule less numerous, less well-
armed, less well-trained and less organised, and, in certain areas,
including air and naval power, at a disadvantage until the very end of
these small wars.89
The need to systematically eliminate insurgents and regain control of
the local population was therefore key in these three cases. The big
difference lay in the fact that the British preferred to wage
comprehensive counterinsurgency through civil-military committees,
keeping many state-building tasks in the hands of civilian officials;
French and Portuguese counterinsurgency state-building was more
militarised, with officers taking over many governance tasks. Never-
theless, it is worth highlighting that the British comprehensive approach
to counterinsurgency was conducted in its most paradigmatic and
successful campaigns under the ultimate control of military officers –
General Templer was formally supremo in Malaya; more informally,
General Erskine was in control of all key aspects of the campaign in
Kenya. Moreover, British military thinking and doctrine insisted that to
be successful the counterinsurgent has to keep the initiative and be
militarily effective.90 So strong was this concern that some guidelines in
British counterinsurgency doctrine could easily be presented – in
isolation – as an example of a coercive approach to counterinsurgency,
when in fact they represent the more coercive aspect of a comprehen-
sive approach to small wars. Templer’s Foreword to ATOM, for
instance, stated: ‘The job of the British Army here [in Malaya] is to kill
or capture Communists’. He went on to highlight key points related to
this aim including ‘the need for offensive action’.91 The 1970 British
counterinsurgency manual established that both ‘a clear cut political
policy and offensive action by the security forces are essential for
89In 1974, with 31 military per thousand Portugal was only surpassed by Israel and
Vietnam, cf. Kenneth Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP 1995), 35.
90Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 134–5 passim; Thompson, Defeating Communist
Insurgency, 58.
91Templer, ‘Foreword’, xi. See also Erskine, ‘Foreword’.
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seizing and holding the initiative’ so that ‘security forces must be
imbued with an aggressive spirit’.92
An Alternative to Minimum Force
No reference whatsoever to minimum force was made in the three
British counterinsurgency manuals issued during the period of the wars
of decolonisation between 1945 and 1970. The traditional portrait of
British counterinsurgency overseas as being completely dominated,
since at least the early twentieth century, by a central norm of minimum
force is therefore largely, if not entirely, a myth, not only in terms of
military practice but also, and even more clearly, of doctrinal
principles.
The authors wishing to continue to advocate the centrality of
minimum force in British counterinsurgency doctrine overseas during
the late colonial period from 1945 to 1970 need to offer a satisfying
answer to at least two key questions: Why would the British military go
to the trouble of developing doctrine – namely three manuals – to deal
specifically with counterinsurgency, and neglect to include in them an
allegedly key principle of minimum force? Where is the evidence for a
generalised practice of minimum force in British counterinsurgencies
overseas before 1970?
What then is the alternative provided by this article? Choosing
between destruction and construction, between winning locals and
coercing insurgents was never an option in British counterinsurgency
doctrine, nor, for that matter, in Portuguese and French counter-
insurgency doctrines. In the three cases analysed, it was the fact that
both destruction and construction, killing insurgents and controlling
locals, were seen as important that led to the emergence of a
comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency so typical of that period
and so topical nowadays.
The revision of the prevailing analysis of British, French and
Portuguese counterinsurgency doctrine advocated in this article has at
least three major implications:
First, in terms of the historical record, it shows it is inaccurate to
present counterinsurgency during the campaigns of decolonisation in
terms of a sharp dichotomy between a successful British population-
centric doctrine of minimum force for winning hearts and minds, and a
failed French or Portuguese enemy-centric doctrine of terror and
coercion. In fact, when British, French and Portuguese doctrines
specifically designed for counterinsurgency finally emerged they shared
important characteristics. These three doctrines mandated both
92UK-MoD, Land Operations: Vol. III, 5, 17–21.
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coercion of insurgents and securing of locals. If we want to continue to
use these labels, then these British, French and Portuguese counter-
insurgency doctrines must be seen as enemy-centric in certain aspects
and population-centric in others; without the latter necessarily entailing
a softer, certainly not by today’s standards, approach to counter-
insurgency – as shown by the ample usage of forced resettlement as a
key tool for regaining control of the population in Malaya, Algeria or
Angola.
Second, regarding the relationship between formal guidelines and
informal practice, this article emphasises that by definition doctrine is
not developed in an intellectual void, it aims to reflect key aspects of
combat experience. The latter will be especially true of successful
theatre-specific doctrine developed during ongoing conflicts. Moreover,
doctrine can – and is meant to – have an important authoritative impact
on new waves of troops so that they avoid some of the worse mistakes
and benefit from some of the best practices of their predecessors. It
seems only logical to think that it is not an accident that successful
commanders in these campaigns, like General Templer, believed
improvements in counterinsurgency practice required the development
and implementation of doctrine adapted to these unconventional
conflicts.
Third, in terms of lessons for today, there are a number of
conclusions that can be drawn, namely regarding the principle of
minimum force. Even when correctly understood as minimum
necessary force, an often missing but very important qualifier – it, or
any other similar population-centric norm, does not solve the great
difficulty of determining the amount of force necessary to successfully
defeat an insurgency, particularly because, and this is the heart of the
matter, the enemy also gets a vote regarding the level of intensity of the
conflict, which can vary significantly in small wars, despite the once
popular misnomer of low intensity operations. Decolonisation cam-
paigns, in particular the French one in Indochina, provide cautionary
lessons regarding the difficulties of fighting well-armed, well-organised
massive insurgencies such as the one carried out by the Viet-Minh
which we might call an ‘hybrid war’ avant la lettre.93
Minimum force provides even less of a solution for the extremely
complex problems of state-building, governance and legitimacy across
very different political contexts. This was already a major problem for
late colonial interventions in the era of decolonisation, it is even more
so today for overseas interventions in a postcolonial era.
93General Andre´ Beaufre, La Guerre Re´volutionnaire: Les Nouvelles Formes de la
Guerre (Paris: Fayard 1972), 227–9.
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The fact that British counterinsurgency doctrine during this vital
period of its development was actually a much more flexible
combination of coercion, attraction and control than we are led to
believe by the notion of minimum force winning hearts and minds as
presented in mainstream analysis points to a major risk. The risk that a
mistaken belief in a uniquely successful principle of minimum force as a
key component of victory in population-centric British counterinsur-
gency in campaigns like Malaya may create dangerously optimistic
expectations for counterinsurgency today in relation to aspects such as:
. the availability of timely intelligence on legitimate targets;
. the level of civilian and military casualties;
. the ability of counterinsurgents to unilaterally control the levels of
violence;
. the likelihood and cost of success in complex wars among the
people.
Alongside these cautionary notes, there is, however, a notable
convergence between these three cases on some of the changes needed
to adapt a conventional army to counterinsurgency. Therefore doctrine
developed during this period is very much worth pondering when
analysing and dealing with counterinsurgencies today, but with due
caution and rigour so as to look carefully at mistakes and costs of past
campaigns as well as successes.
Lastly, the most difficult question: What is essential to defeat an
insurgency according to these three cases? The best answer is that it is
indispensable to have a doctrine that is specifically designed for
counterinsurgency and well adapted to local circumstances. But
although good doctrine intelligently applied is necessary for making
conventional Armed Forces more capable in unconventional warfare, it
is not sufficient to ensure victory. Additionally there must be a
politically realistic ultimate aim taking into account the necessarily
protracted and highly politicised nature of this type of conflict. The
main factor determining the different end-result of these campaigns was
the fact that Britain had a more realistic definition of victory, in the
context of the post-1945 international system, in terms of controlled
decolonisation, than France or Portugal. This allowed Britain to
sometimes successfully present the violence of the insurgents as the
main obstacle to self-rule, and frame successful counterinsurgency as
the best way to secure independence. The key to victory is the ability to
exploit positive doctrinal and military results in the pursuit of a realistic
strategic aim.
In conclusion, it should be made clear that this article does
not contend that British counterinsurgency doctrine entirely lacked
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discrimination in the use of force in its small wars of decolonisation or
that doctrine was irrelevant in British success in some of these
campaigns. However, it does highlight the fact that British counter-
insurgency was conducted in a more complex, and also often in a more
coercive way than long-prevailing analyses based on the alleged
centrality of a principle of minimum force would suggest. British
counterinsurgency doctrine, in its comprehensive approach, was also
less unique than is usually claimed, being closer to other examples of
late colonial counterinsurgency doctrines.
This article therefore challenges the usual explanation of British
success, and French and Portuguese failure in small wars. Ironically, it
can even be argued that French and Portuguese counterinsurgencies
suffered strategic defeat because of an excessive, rather than an
insufficient, belief in the power of population-centric counterinsur-
gency. French and Portuguese leaders seemed to believe, until it was too
late, that new counterinsurgency doctrine based on soft psychological
warfare could replace hard political choices, and that officers trained
according to new counterinsurgency doctrines could win the hearts and
minds of local overseas populations converting them into loyal citizens
of a multiracial fatherland. British aims regarding local populations
were usually more modest and achievable: controlling locals by
isolating them from insurgents and providing them with security, and
then getting them to accept a gradual process of decolonisation; this
was done, however, without resorting to the doctrinal principle of
minimum force, and was just part of the story of British counter-
insurgency, which also required a significant measure of coercion both
in principle and in practice.
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